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The Deliverance of Evil: Utopia and Evil 
 
This chapter traces the problem of evil in utopia from Thomas More 
to the Marquis de Sade. Utopian thought recognizes human imperfection and 
the basic dualism in human nature. Utopias are discourses on human nature 
and the possibility of a better human society rather than simply blueprints of 
perfection, indeed they imagine ‘an imperfect utopia, or, differently put, a 
utopia suited for imperfect creatures.’ The question that arises in utopian 
thought is not if evil exists but how to deliver us from evil.  
 
 
*** 
 
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan 
The proper study of mankind is man  
(Alexander Pope, Essay on Man) 
 
 
One of the primary preoccupations of utopian thought is the relationship 
between the individual and society. Thus, ‘to know thyself’, including one’s 
propensity for good and evil and to study ‘mankind’ is the necessary 
foundation for utopian thinking and a continuous process towards better 
statesmanship: 
Once he [the human being] has grasped himself and established what 
is his, without expropriation and alienation, in real democracy, there 
arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all 
and in which no-one has yet been: Heimat (Bloch 1986: 1376). 
 
According to Ernst Bloch, human utopian desire is determined by the desire 
for Heimat, not the nostalgic return to an irrecoverable home, past or 
childhood, but the path towards an unalienated existence. Bloch’s messianic 
version of the Marxist idea of alienation presumes a truthful ‘self-encounter’ 
which as the proactive, confirmatory fight for ‘real democracy’ prepares the 
utopian community to come. This utopian desire is then a spiritual, 
intellectual and political one: 
This intending toward a star, a joy, a truth to set against the empirical, 
beyond its satanic night and especially beyond its night of incognito, 
is the only way still to find truth, the question about us is the only 
problem, the resultant of every world-problem, and to formulate this 
Self- and We-Problem in everything, the opening, reverberating 
through the world, of the gates of homecoming, is the ultimate basic 
principle of utopian philosophy." (Bloch 2000: 206, emphasis in 
original) 
 
One common and continuous objection to the possibility of utopia is the 
conviction of the irredeemability of human nature (Hannah Arendt) and the 
existence of evil. Thus, the cause of the failure of utopia per se, as anti-
utopians such as Jacoby and Gray have recently argued, is its failure to 
consider human imperfection. Utopian thought in this sense is interpreted as 
universal to the point of totalitarian and dictatorial. However, neither the 
genre’s founder, Thomas More, nor seventeenth-and eighteenth-century 
followers, nor Ernst Bloch could claim absolute perfection and universality 
as invariable principles. This chapter suggests that Utopian thought 
recognizes human imperfection and the basic dualism in human nature: 
bonum et malum. Utopias are discourses on human nature and the possibility 
of a better human society rather than simply blueprints of perfection, indeed 
they imagine ‘an imperfect utopia, or, differently put, a utopia suited for 
imperfect creatures.’ (Griswold 1998: 302). If utopia did not acknowledge 
human potential for evil, there would be no need for totalitarian and 
authoritarian utopias and dystopias. The question that arises in utopian 
thought is not if evil exists but how to deliver us from evil.  
 
*** 
 
And the LORD God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know 
good and evil (Genesis 3:22) 
 
Utopia’s premise is that humans were created essentially good but at some 
point fell from grace. In the following, I will consider in broad terms two 
narratives of the Fall and their consequences for utopian thought. Firstly, I 
will explore the consequences of the historical Fall and the emergence of the 
utopia of realized eschatology and the ethnographic utopia as two examples 
of how moral atonement in a spiritual and material sense could be achieved. 
Secondly, I will investigate the consequences of the existential Fall and its 
utopian possibilities in educational utopias. 
The long and complex history of sources of the doctrines of the Fall 
and the Original Sin cannot be illuminated in this short chapter. Suffice it to 
remind us that the historical Fall as described in Genesis Book 3 is the first 
scriptural source of the Fall but its significance is now seen as mythical and 
historical (see Paul Ricoeur, Wiley: 13-55). The New Testament recorded the 
teachings of Paul (Romans 5:12-21), 1 Corinthians 15:22 and Psalms 51:5 
which considered the consequences of the Fall as cosmological and 
ontological significant; ‘Just as sin entered the world through one man, and 
death through sin, and in this way death came to all man, because all sinned’ 
(Romans 5:12). Within the different Christian doctrines, though differing 
here in their interpretation of the Scriptures, the Original Sin can be 
redeemed. Particularly important to utopian thought is the moral influence 
atonement doctrine (Abelard) which teaches that moral atonement is effected 
through the teachings and example of Jesus, the Christian Church he 
founded, and the inspiring effect of his martyrdom and resurrection. Moral 
influence atonement doctrine paths the way for the utopia of realized 
eschatology and simple living. Let us with the founder of the genre, Thomas 
More. 
*** 
 
In 1516 Thomas More (1478-1535), advisor to King Henry VIII, Catholic 
martyr and saint published his most controversial book, De Optimo 
Reipublicae Statu deque nova insula Utopia Libellus vere aureaus, nec 
minus salutaris quam festivus (Of the best state law and of the new island 
Utopia, truly a golden booklet, as pleasant as it is cheerful), now known as 
Utopia. It was conceived during More’s appointment in 1515 as a delegate 
to a conference on Anglo-Flemish commerce which More’s humanist friends 
Erasmus, Peter Giles and Jerome Busleyden attended. More famously 
composed Book II, Discourse on Utopia, first and concluded it in 1516 with 
Book I, Dialogue of Counsel. The book’s unusual structure and composition, 
the title’s pun on ‘no-place’ and ‘good-place’, the use of ambivalent 
rhetorical strategies (litotes) and double-coding of the place and character 
names creates a truly open text that reflects critically on the possibility of a 
‘best state of a commonwealth’.1 
 Book I records the political and social ailments of early modern 
Europe through the eyes of the fictitious sailor Raphael Hytholdaeus in 
debate with Thomas More, Peter Giles and Jerome Busleyden. It echoes 
principal humanist debates on the best state government, civic self-
government, social equality, political wisdom in the light of the development 
of absolutism and early capitalism. Whereas in Book I, England is seen as 
held in the clutches of agrarian capitalism ‘where sheep are devouring men’, 
the Utopians in Book II recognize the true value of material goods and class 
distinction: ‘for how fine soever that thread may be, it was once no better 
than the fleece of a sheep, and that sheep was a sheep still for all its wearing 
it.’ Some of these issues were also discussed by More’s friends and 
contemporaries such as Erasmus in Adages (Chiliades Adagiorum, 1502-32) 
or his The Praise of Folly (1511). The paradigm governing the Adages was 
the principle of amicorum communia omnia (‘Friends hold all things in 
Common’), the spirit of true community that we also find in Utopia.  
Since its conception, the multifaceted ambiguity of Utopia has puzzled 
philosophers and readers alike. One paradox important to our investigation is 
that a committed Christian such as Thomas More created a seemingly 
secular and proto-communist commonwealth based on principles of social 
justice (see Bradshaw for an excellent discussion). In Utopia, moral 
transformation of mankind is dialectically entwined with political and 
structural transformation. Utopia’s architectural symmetry and uniformity 
reflects and at the same time enforces social engineering and secular 
governance.  The fifty-four ‘large and faire cities, or shiere towns,’ on 
More’s island are uniform and well ordered. The political structure of the 
island of Utopia is a commonwealth by direct representation, the society is 
composed of kinship households and the state provides extended academic and 
vocational education. There is no private property: the houses are easily 
accessible and their doors are never locked.  The market squares and the 
dining halls allow for communal rituals, communication and political debates.  
However, Utopia is not Paradise on earth. The ‘utopian paradox’ of high crime 
and death penalty, slavery, restriction on travel, a strict military ethos, 
euthanasia and an unforgiving  patriarchal system within the kinship 
households undermines the idea of class and gender equality and social 
progressiveness. The satire and rhetorical ambivalence undercuts the idea that 
Utopia is a simplistic ‘Golden Handbook’ for change. The dialogue between 
Book I and II, the multiple perspectives in Book II and finally, the 
unreliability of Hythloday as the ‘nonsense peddler’ turn the text into a 
satirical musing on Utopian possibilities. As the fictional More closes his 
account, ‘I cannot perfectly agree to everything he [Hytholoday] has related; 
however, there are many things in the Commonwealth of Utopia that I rather 
wish, than hope, to see followed in our governments.’  
How to resolve this paradox? I would suggest that Utopia needs to be 
contextualized within Christian Humanism and Augustinian philosophy. 
Thomas More adheres to the Augustinian principles that good and evil are 
part of human nature. The concept of Original Sin is relevant but made 
solely mankind’s responsibility. Whilst natural evil cannot be influenced or 
prevented, moral evil is caused by the will of man who chose to deviate from 
the path of perfect goodness.  Thus Utopia’s ruling principle is virtue, its 
prime evil in Book I, pride, ‘the chief and progenitor of all plagues’. Virtue 
is ‘life ordered according to nature…’ and governed by reason.  
 But now, sir, they think not felicity to rest in all pleasure, but only in 
that pleasure that is good and honest, and that hereto as to perfect 
blessedness our nature is allured and drawn even of virtue, whereto 
only they that be of the contrary opinion do attribute felicity. (More 
1991:85). 
 
Part of the virtue, honesty and felicity is the absence of greed and pride 
brought about by private property, a significant moral evil.  
Book II of Utopia thus imagines a Pelganian fantasy of a quasi-monastic 
society without private property and evil. But the absence of sin is not 
necessarily a ‘sign of historical hopefullness’ (Shklar: 370). One of the 
criticisms that Utopia often receives is its seemingly totalitarian structure of 
control. Evil is a fact, surveillance and capital punishment even on the island 
of Utopia underpin the Utopian social engineering project. One could indeed 
argue that the foundation of Utopia was an act of pride (and colonialism) by 
King Utopus. So, social engineering itself is not enough to achieve utopia. 
As Bradshaw has identified in Erasmus’ work, ‘grace will perfect nature 
only if nature as disposed itself, by moral endeavour, to receive grace.’ 
(p.11) We return back to the idea that (self-)knowledge is the path to utopia. 
This is perhaps also why the Utopian citizens need to undergo the process of 
conversion: 
 
But after they heard us speak of the name of Christ, of His doctrine, 
laws, miracles, and of the no less wonderful constancy of so many 
martyrs , whose blood willingly shed brought a number of nations 
throughout all parts of the world into their sect, you will not believe 
with how glad minds they agreed unto the same, whether it were by 
the secret inspiration of God, or else for that they thought it nighest 
unto that opinion which among them is countest the chiefest. Howbeit, 
I think this was no small help and furtherance in the matter, that they 
heard us say that Christ instituted among His all things common, and 
that the same community doth yet remain amongst the rightest 
Christian companies. (More 1991: 119). 
 
What distinguishes the Utopians in Book II from the proud politicians in 
Book I is the moral openness and curiosity. As Bradshaw suggests ‘[i]t was 
a response that combined critical judgment with openness to change’ – the 
essence of any utopian project (Bradshaw: 26). 
 
*** 
"Behold, I make all Things New"(Revelations 2 1: 5). 
 
One of the paradigmatic consequences of the doctrine of the historical Fall is 
the theology of realized eschatology (see Dodd 1953). Realized Eschatology 
strives to create a Heaven on Earth or at least facilitates and prepares the 
second coming of Christ. Thus, in this framework, socio-political thinking and 
millennial ideas converges in either collective vision or personal endeavours, 
or four types according to Collins; the 'political', 'cosmic', 'personal' and 
'realized' to deliver the world from evil (Collins: 330-337). A cluster of 
collective endeavours appeared during the English Civil Wars with groups 
such as the Levellers, Diggers and Fifth Monarchists who place the concept 
of social and political evil within the context of millennial enthusiasm. The 
prophet Mary Cary explores this in her visionary text, A New and More 
Exact Mappe; or, Description of New Jerusalems Glory (1651). Cary brings 
together the millennial ideal of a just society with the pragmatic political 
questions surrounding the establishment of the English republic.  
Christian Church fellowships such as the Amish, the Mennonites, the 
Shakers, the Bruderhof community, the Harmony Society and in the 
nineteenth century, the Tolstoyian movement and the American Oneida 
community followed closely the exemplary ministry of Jesus and too, 
prepared the second coming of Christ with very concrete communitarian 
experiments. As Snook has suggested, these communities are guided by the 
‘rhetoric of reversal’ guided by the teachings of Christ. These reverse ‘our 
normal seeing of the world by telling parables of God’s way of living and 
ruling’ (Snook: 81). He continues to argue that the ‘victory of the spirit of 
God over evil can only happen through the reversal, or conversion, of the 
human heart…’ (Snook: 93). Anticipating the Liberation Theology of the 
twentieth century, realized eschatology locates evil in social and political 
injustice brought about by the sins of pride and greed.  
In the eighteenth century it was particularly Swedenborg whose realized 
eschatology influenced utopian thought and intentional communities into the 
nineteenth century. Mankind, according to Swedenborg has a hereditary 
inclination for evil that can be overcome by will. Hereditary evil, according 
to Swedenborg: 
 
consists in willing and hence in thinking evil. Hereditary evils begin in the 
will itself, and in the thought, thence derived and being the very conatus or 
endeavour that is therein, and which adjoining itself even when the person is 
doing what is good (Arcana Coelestia, quoted in Dibb: 212). 
 
Swedenborg proclaimed that the Second Coming of Christ had already 
happened and was only revealed to him through the Holy Spirit. Following 
his divine inspiration, he planned on establishing a new community, a New 
Jerusalem to be built on earth based on his understanding of virtue and 
goodness (see Emanuel Swedenborg, The Last Judgment and Babylon 
Destroyed. All the Predictions in the Apocalypse are at This Day Fulfilled 
(1758). Swedenborg inspired his fellow Swedes Wadström and 
Nordenskjöld to a Plan for a Free Community upon the Coast of 
Africa under the Protection of Great Britain; but Intirely. Independent of All 
(1789).  This scheme was motivated by the French Revolution and the anti-
slavery movement in Britain and Olaudah Equiano’s plans to resettle slaves 
to Sierra Leone. 
In an appendix to the Plan, a number of articles for governance of the 
colony are proposed as well as a general invitation to apply for the scheme 
attached. Suffrage for all adult males, the abolition of slavery and universal 
social equality are guiding principles. However, the Plan’s the political 
intentions go beyond the question of abolition, for, as the authors ask, ‘To 
what purpose is Spiritual Liberty without Civil Liberty?’ (Plan: xi). Central 
to the argument is the conceptualization of moral evil as political and social 
inequality rooted in ‘the Lust of Dominion’ and ‘the Lust of Possession’ 
(Plan: x). Whilst Africans are literally enslaved, Europeans are suffering 
under the ‘abject servility to innumerable monied Tyrant’ (Plan: iv-v).  
Furthermore, as Swedenborg has argued in his tract, True Christian Religion 
(1786), he identified a pre-lapsarian grace and spirituality in Africa which 
the Europeans have lost.   Thus he speaks of the Africans as ‘interior’ human 
beings ’guided by ‘virtue of an elevated Spirit’ opposition to the ‘external’ 
thus sensual and superficial qualities of corrupted Europeans ( Swedenborg 
1786: 701-2).  
 The convergence between realized eschatology and utopian primitivism 
results in Swedenborg designing a pessimistic conjectural history of 
mankind consisting of 4 Ages described as separate Ecclesia. 
 
There have been in general four churches (quatuor Ecclesiae) on this earth 
since its creation….The first church (Prima Ecclesia), which may be called 
the Most Ancient Church (Antiquissima), came into existence before the 
flood, and its ending or departure is described by the flood. The second 
church (Altera Ecclesia), which may be called the Ancient Church 
(Antiqua), was in Asia and in parts of Africa; this came to an end and 
perished as the result of idolatrous practices. The third (Tertia Ecclesia) was 
the Israelite Church (Israelitica), begun by the proclamation of the Ten 
Commandments on Mount Sinai, and continued through the Word written by 
Moses and the Prophets. This came to an end and terminated as the result of 
profaning the Word, a process which reached its full development at the time 
the Lord came into the world. That was why they crucified Him who was the 
Word. The fourth (Quarta Ecclesia) is the Christian Church (Christiana) 
founded by the Lord by means of the Evangelists and the Apostles…. 
(Swedenborg, 1786: 760). 
 
Swedenborg’s New Jerusalem seeks to return to the principles of the Prima 
Ecclesia modeled on the spiritual elevation of African tribes, a pre-lapsarian 
spiritual holism lost in the Fall. 
 
*** 
Quick now, here, now, always— 
A condition of complete simplicity  
(Costing not less than everything)  
And all shall be well and 
All manner of thing shall be well  
(T.S. Eliot,’Little Gidding’). 
 
If Paradise was lost then surely it could be found. The desire to return 
to a pre-lapsarian grace has informed ethnographic utopias that propose the 
return to original innocence, virtues and simple existence as found in 
primitive societies of newfound lands. The idea of simple living, echoed by 
Christian and monastic traditions, derived its justification from a) the 
exemplary ministry of Jesus; b) a pessimistic conjectural history of 
humanity, in which innocent humans were rendered corrupt by society and 
civilization. The temptations of wealth and the evils of material luxuries 
have, in this framework, spiritual, ontological and socio-political 
consequences. The recreation or rediscovery of Eden, a trope that is 
prevalent in utopias, is on the surface a geographical endeavor but essential 
is a spiritual return, a moral regeneration. 
The Irish monk, Saint Brendan documented his seven-year search for 
the earthly Paradise in the Navigatio of Saint Brendan (ca 900 AD). The 
settlement of America was recorded as the discovery of Eden, Paradise, 
Canaan and a chiliastic ‘new Heaven and a new Earth’, even the later Cotton 
Mather’s Magnalia Christi Americana (1720) and the writings by the Shaker 
Ann Lee described America as Eden.  Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis echoes 
Richard Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the 
English Nation (1589) and reflects Walter Raleigh’s journey to, and disastrous 
colonization of Guiana. Gonzalo’s famous micro-Utopia in The Tempest, ‘Had 
I plantation of this isle, my lord,/And were the king on’t, what would I do?’, 
borrows from the 1609 Bermuda pamphlets but also paraphrases Michel 
Montaigne’s primitivist argument on natural justice and virtue made in his 
essay ‘On Cannibals’ (1580). Michael Drayton’s poem ‘Ode to the Virginian 
Voyage’ (1606), borrows from Hakluyt, projects ‘Earth’s onely Paradise’ 
onto the New World  but at the same time calls upon ‘You brave heroic 
minds,/Worthy your country’s name’ to refuel England’s eminence in the 
colonization of America. Vasco de Quiroga (ca 1470-1565), translator and 
passionate disciple of Utopia, attempted on several occasions to realize 
More’s blueprint in Mexico. His hospital-pueblos of Santa Fe and the free 
Indian communities in Lake Pátzcuaro were highly successful until the 
prohibition of slavery was lifted by Charles V in 1534. Quiroga’s book 
Información en derecho (Information on the Law, 1535) projects the Utopian 
vision of a Christian State onto the New World. Similarly to More and 
Montaigne who were disenchanted by some aspects of European society, 
Quiroga hails the native justice and virtue of Mexican Indians as exemplary 
and sketches out the scheme of an elective Christian monarchy to govern the 
Mexican Indians freely and peacefully without colonial force and 
intervention. Both de las Casas and Quiroga pre-empted the eighteenth-
century Jesuit Utopian colonies (‘Reductiones’) in Paraguay which sought to 
reconcile primitive Christianity and ethnic primitivism.  
In the seventeenth century, historical pessimism created utopias that 
idealized the ‘state of nature’ and defined society and civilization as 
progressive alienation form an original good – they thus opposed Hobbes’s 
anti-social notion of the ‘natural’ man. Here utopia again promised the 
regeneration of society to its original state of innocence and peace. Utopias 
such as Denis Vairasse’s History of the Sevarites  (1675) or Gabriel de 
Foigny’s La Terre Australe connu (The Southern Land Known, 1676) 
document simple, virtuous and self-sufficient communities in the Antipodes. 
Aphra Behn’s description of the Indians in Surinam in Oroonoko (1688) 
anticipated Jacques Rousseau’s paean to the innocence, simplicity and 
peaceableness of the ‘noble savage’.  The projection of utopian hope and 
nostalgic desire onto the New World continued in the eighteenth-century. 
These utopias promoted domestic, self-sufficient agricultural economies, 
recreating the true meaning of Paradise as walled garden (Greek παράδεισος 
(parádeisos) or orchard (Hebrew פרדס (pardes) and a simple life. Henry 
Mackenzie in The Man of the World, (1773), Lesage’s Les Aventures de M. 
Robert Chevalier, dit de Beauchêne, capitaine de flibustiers dans la 
Nouvelle-France (1732), Abbé Prévost’s great philosophical novel, Le 
Philosophe anglais, ou histoire de Monsieur Cleveland (1731-39) and Louis 
Armand de Lom d’Arc’ Baron de La Hotan’s three part Nouveau Voyages de 
MR. Le Baron de Lahontan dans L’Amerique septentrionale (1703) idealize 
the exemplary simplicity of the Native American societies. Another, more 
conspicuous but real-life community was founded by Christian Gottlieb 
Priber in America. Priber left Germany in 1735 to found a city state named 
Paradise, for prisoners, criminals and slaves amongst the Cherokee nation. 
Priber sought, if unsuccessfully, to imitate the simple and more ‘natural’ 
lifestyle of the North American Indians, a lifestyle he encountered as a 
former captive of Indians himself.  
By the second half of the eighteenth century, Pacific explorations 
moved Edenic projections onto the South Sea Islands. Denis Diderot’s 
Supplement to Bougainville’s ‘Voyage’ (1772) made a case for the simple, 
natural ways of a South Sea Island culture and rejected the idea of progress. 
In the Platonic dialogue of the Supplement, Diderot emphasises the validity 
and superiority of the Tahitian state natural law and morality that seems to 
make religious and civil law somewhat superfluous:   
 
… if morality were based on men’s external relations with one 
another, religious laws would be superfluous and civil law would 
merely articulate the law of nature. […] Or, if it’s judged necessary to 
retain all three, the last two should be strictly patterned on the first 
which we carry with us engraved in our hearts, and which is always 
the strongest (Diderot 1992: 67). 
 
According to Diderot, man is naturally good and evil but his adherence to 
natural law, will prevent moral evil. The natural code is accessible to man 
via reason, moral evil thus is man’s own and mankind’s collective 
responsibility (Diderot  Encyplopédie: 19).  The return to the (natural) 
simplicity of a society ruled by natural law will enhance man’s natural 
ability to moral good and prevent political abuses of power and government. 
The Tahitian society in the Supplement represents the early stages of 
Diderot’s pessimistic conjectural history of human civilisation, but one that 
cannot be recovered anymore. The solution that Diderot ultimately proposed 
is the social contract that is, as suggested in the above quotation, based on 
the law of nature as a moral and civic guide line. 
*** 
 
 
‘the best of all worlds’ (Leibnitz) 
 
My brief discussion above has indicated that whilst writers and philosophers 
who struggled with the question of evil within a theological context, also 
brought the question into the realm of the socio-political. Enlightenment 
philosophies shifted the question of evil again, this time into the realm of 
ethics and psychology. The two  Enlightenment standpoints vis-à-vis the 
question of evil differed in their demand to either make evil intelligible 
(Rousseau) or accept it as unintelligible (Voltaire, Neiman: 8).  This debate 
was particularly fervent in the aftermath of the Earthquake of Lisbon (1755) 
when the optimistic stance of Leibnitz to assume that all of God’s actions 
happen for the best was queried. Voltaire’s Candide, ou l'Optimisme (1759) 
lampoons Leibnitz’s optimism and faith that the causal link between natural 
evil and moral evil will become apparent to us eventually.  In this vein, 
Pangloss repeatedly asks: ‘How can a benevolent God permit this terrible 
evil to happen?’ Voltaire argued in his Lettres Philosophiques (1733), 
especially in his piece on Pascal, the need to revise the doctrine of original 
sin and the idea of human greatness that is only possible in man’s original 
condition in the Garden of Eden or some remnant of that blissful state in 
fallen humanity. It is possible to imagine a better world but the concept of 
Paradise or utopia as a state of constant and unchangeable happiness and 
tranquillity is, according to Voltaire, mere ennui , and counteracts the 
principle of perfectibility:  
Once again, ‘tis impossible for mankind to continue in that suppos’d 
lethargy; ‘tis absurd to imagine it, and foolish to pretend to it. Man is 
born for action, as the fire tends upwards, and a stone downwards 
(Voltaire 1994: 137).  
The concept of degeneration that is posited here does not compare to 
Rousseau’s negative anthropology but perceives the idea of perfection as 
stasis, perfectibility as a creative and modern desire for change. 
Accordingly, this desire for change is mirrored in the episodic nature of 
Candide where the protagonists travel through a range of utopias from the 
‘paradis terrestre’ Thunder-Ten-Throckh to the fabled El Dorado only to 
leave them at the end to find their utopias within themselves.  The problem 
of evil (and utopian perfection) is answered by the practical application of 
Voltaire’s philosophy of pragmatic optimism, 'il faut cultiver son jardin'. 
These texts do not reject utopia per se but reflect the necessity of continual 
transformation, the necessity of what Goethe came to call Bildung. It is 
therefore no coincidence that these utopias bear similarities to the 
Bildungsroman where individual evolution and growth is interwined with 
social perfectibility. 
*** 
The paradigmatic shift of evil to an ethical and psychological category 
opened possibilities for educational utopias that seek to fashion moral agents 
and responsible citizens. Elements of this educational stance can be found in 
Thomas More’s Utopia and its underlying humanist ethical discourse.  
An earlier Lutheran version of an educational utopia was proposed by 
the German theologian Johann Valentin Andreae. In his Republicae 
Christinaopolitanae Descriptio (Christianopolis) (1619), Andreae sought to 
renew ‘the inner life of the Lutheran church’ and society. The pattern of 
Andreae’s fictitious community is succinctly described in the text as a 
‘republic of workers, living in equality, desiring peace, and renouncing 
riches.’ It is based on principles of rationality, order and complete social 
control underpinned, similarly to Utopia, by a geometric city plan with a 
College in its centre. Andreae’s targeted sins are Tyranny, Sophistry and 
Hypocrisy, variations on Pride and self-interest. Christianopolis’s motto is: 
‘We have come from freedom to doing good.’ Thus, the chief Magistrates 
Por, Sin , Mor represent the monotriad of Power, Knowledge and Love to 
banish evil.( Andreae 1999 35).Education is the principal political and social 
tool in Christianopolis. It is the basis of a superior society, consisting of  
intellectually and morally exceptional citizens with a very distinctive 
political agenda: the education of the Utopian subject.  
In his educational tract, Emile (1762) and in particular, the chapter on 
‘The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar’, Rousseau argues quite 
radically that evil is man’s own doing and grace is obtained entirely by self-
knowledge; ‘Providence hath left man at liberty, not that he should do evil, 
but good, by choice (Rousseau 2008:268).  As indicated above, Rousseau 
was not convinced of the notion of progress and civilization. Indeed his 
second Discourse, Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité 
parmi les hommes (Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among 
Men, 1754) argues that the progress of civilization has resulted in the 
alienation of human nature. The Fall has been a gradual and collective 
process (see Neiman: 45) and can only be reversed by nurturing and 
developing ‘amour de soi’ (love of self) against ‘amour propre’ (self-love). 
His educational utopia, Emile, is ultimately a project to develop this sociable 
and virtuous love of self into a moral being who freely decides to act 
morally: 
 
The love of others springing from self-love, is the source of human 
justice. The whole of morality is summed up in the gospel in this 
summary of the law. (Rousseau 1963: 197) 
 
The development and education of the main character Emile illustrates ‘the 
story of the development of one individual, the nature of the connection – or 
transition – between the state of nature and the state of society, the 
individual and the social – moral, goodness and virtue, natural freedom and 
mature liberty.’ (Gill 2010: 207) The ultimate aim is to educate different 
kinds of citizens motivated by ‘amour de soi’ and natural freedom that form 
the basis of universal human justice. 
 
 
*** 
 
‘Do as thou wouldst’ (Rabelais) 
 
In opposition to the geometry of the Thomas More’s Utopia, the anarchistic 
utopia as devised by Rabelais in his Abbey of Thelème (1534) is ruled by an 
Arcadian primitivism that determines the constructed environment, social 
relations and organisation of private/domestic relations. Especially, the 
liberation of human sexuality (strictly regulated in the More’s utopia) is the 
main reason for the success of these Utopian societies. Rabelais’s Abbey of 
Thelème (1534) pre-empted the libertarian Utopianism of de Sade in 
declaring the absolute authority of the individual, governed only by his or 
her wishes and desires. ‘Do as thou wouldst’ is the motto of the Abbey.  
William Beckford’s Gothic Oriental tale Vathek, an Arabian Tale 
(1782) presents an Orientalist spin on this motto. Beckford’s imaginary 
geographies in Vathek are a hyperbolic and anti-utopian projection of 
political and erotic fantasies onto the East in the vein of the Orientalist 
writings of the eighteenth century. The equation of Muslim Empires with 
despotism figures was already presented in Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des 
lois (1748) and Lettres persanes (1721) and in conjectural anthropologies 
such as John Millar’s The Origins of the Distinction of Ranks (1781) and 
William Alexander’s The History of Women from the Earliest Antiquity to 
the Present Time (1779). The arbitrary power of the Sultan in Montesquieu 
was to remind Europeans of the once powerful and expansionist Muslim 
empires and of the dangers of the abuses of absolute monarchy in Europe 
itself and used the Orient as a warning exemplum for the political evil of 
absolutism.  
In Vathek, the particular focus of attention is the constitutional 
institutions of monarchy and sovereignty: they are presented as pride, 
corruption, gluttony and evil institutionalised in the character of Vathek the 
Caliph and his mother. At the end, the Caliph and his mother are condemned 
to eternally suffer in purgatory. However, as Lewis has suggested, ‘humor 
and horror are mixed in an effort to undermine the allure of both piety and 
impiety, good and evil, creating a sense of detachment from all values. If the 
only possible choice is between a laughable malice and an unappealing 
virtue, why bother choose?’(Lewis: 14). Embedded in this Orientalist 
nihilism is assumption of the failure of the Enlightenment project.  
Another take on the Enlightenment project and its Kantian principle of 
‘Reason which is not led by another agency’ (Adorno and Horkheimer: 79) 
are the libertine writings by the Marquis de Sade consequently pushed the 
limits of this principle to its libertine limits. His nihilistic Les 120 journées 
de Sodome or l'école du libertinage (The 120 Days of Sodom, or the School 
of Libertinism, 1785) or  Justine ou Les Malheurs de la vertu (Justine, or 
The Misfortunes of the Virtue, 1791) not only deny the existence of God but 
created a world based upon total human freedom. As an early precursor to 
the anti-utopia, de Sade identifies structural order and symmetry as we 
encountered in Thomas More as totalitarian and terroristic. All the above 
utopian imaginations presented to deliver mankind from evil are rejected by 
de Sade. He accepts the premise that mankind is equally capable of good and 
evil, that moral evil is a choice: 
 if it [Providence] places us in a situation where evil becomes 
necessary, and at the same time gives us the chance to commit it, it is 
because this evil serves the law of Providence as much as good does, 
and derives an equal benefit from both.  It has created us all equal, but 
he who disrupts this equality is no more guilty than he who seeks to 
restore it.  (de Sade: 28). 
The balance between good and evil must be maintained, furthermore, in the 
Sadean unfettered existence, the choice of giving into evil might be in fact 
(and paradoxically) choosing the lesser evil: 
 
however fair it may be, virtue is the worst option available, when it is 
too weak to combat vice, and that in a century that is thoroughly 
corrupt , the safe course is to do as the others (de Sade: 5). 
 
 
In this framework, the Original Sin is perceived as an act of freedom. The 
alienation of the individual’s autonomy and self-determination from the 
social context is a problematic interpretation of Kant’s understanding of 
individual autonomy (see Adorno and Horkheimer 1988). The Kantian 
‘categorial imperative’ is the moral  foundation of the ‘Kingdom of Ends’, 
‘an association in which the freedom of each individual could coexist with 
that of every other individual without conflict or violence’ ( Dews: 19) 
If Thomas More posited a utopian paradox that questioned the very 
utopian reasoning he presents in Utopia, de Sade unveils a similar 
incongruity in the utopian quest to resolve the question of evil: in order to 
correct human nature as a politically pragmatic gesture, to guide it towards 
the moral good, does this then necessarily lead to the acceptance of the 
lesser evil? (see Pelinka: 167).  
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